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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided Arkansas
v. Sullivan,' a seemingly unremarkable per curiam opinion that facilitated
the conviction of a small time methamphetamine dealer whose trial had
been aborted by pretrial rulings that were affirmed by his state's highest
court. 2 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling that in suppressing
Sullivan's drugs, the state court had ruled "flatly contrary to this Court's
controlling precedent," 3 Whren v. United States.4 Five years earlier,
Whren had confronted the very question before the Court in Sullivan:
*
1.
2.
of reh'g,

Professor, California Western School of Law.
532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam).
State v. Sullivan, I I S.W.3d 526 (Ark. 2000), opinion supplemented on denial
16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark. 2000), and rev'd, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769

(2001).
3.
4.

Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771.
517 U.S. 806 (1996).

Does the Fourth Amendment's injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures prevent the prosecution from using evidence that police
discovered by way of a5 so-called "pretext"? Whren held that it does not;
Sullivan followed suit.
The pretext problem had been percolating in the U.S. Supreme Court
for at least four decades before its putative burial in 1996 by Whren.6
Indeed, it is one of those areas of criminal procedure where the term
"confused patchwork, 7 to lift a term of Justice White's, would be
apt.
"Pretext" refers to an action that was done for fishy reasons. In other
words, calling something "a pretext" is not so much a criticism of the
action as it is of its motive. And while in just seven years Whren already
has been cited over one thousand times in court opinions and has been
the central subject of some fifty law review articles,8 the criteria of
pretexts seem to be taken as given; it is their consequences that get all
the play. Because no agreement on what those criteria are has been
reached, I hope to establish them here. This Article, therefore, will reflect
on (1) how Whren's failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext
accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has
killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and
(2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure,
which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from
intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should
play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
II.

WHAT IS A PRETEXT?

Consider Jean-Paul Sartre's use of the term "pretext" in the following
garden-variety example, which appears in his autobiography:
By classifying authors in order of merit, he was paying lip-service; this surface
hierarchy ill concealed his preferences, which were utilitarian: de Maupassant
provided the best translation material for his German pupils; Goethe, beating
Gottfried Keller by a nose, could not be equalled for compositions in French. As
a humanist, my grandfather held novels in low esteem; as a teacher, he valued
them because of their vocabulary. He ended by reading only selected passages,
5. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771; Whren, 517 U.S. at 819.
6. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). There is a brief
reference even earlier. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) ("An

arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.").

7. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 649 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
(describing the Court's federal habeas corpus cases).
8. See, e.g., Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privac,, Beyond Probable Cause,
Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies ftr Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 693, 694 & n.7 (1998) (citing articles discussing pretext arrests). Among
the more frequently cited is David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
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and I saw him, some years later, enjoy an extract from Madame Bovary in
Mironneau's Readings when the complete Flaubert had been awaiting his
pleasure for twenty years. I felt that he lived on the dead, which to some degree
complicated my relations with them. Under the pretext of worshipping them, he
op in order to carry
kept them in chains and did not refrain from cutting them
9
them more convenientlv from one language to another.

Here, Sartre's grandfather, Charles Schweitzer, is depicted as someone
whose action in question is his classifying authors in their order of merit.
What makes it a pretext is that the reason, if any, one would ordinarily
have for doing so would be the authors' imagination, their compassion,
their expressiveness, not their tendency to make teaching a foreign language
easier. And how do we conclude that Grandfather Schweitzer's rankings
were pretextual? The most telling evidence here is the shakiness of his
claim to classification by merit in light of the fact that young Sartre
observed that his grandfather had a practice of citing canonical works,
but never settling down to actually read them.') That is to say, Grandfather
Schweitzer used the great works, but not because they were great. Instead,
his real reasons for the classification by merit might have been to
conceal from his grandson his lowbrow tastes, his preference for minor
authors, or that what he liked about the great authors was not that they were
great authors but that their books were somehow useful to his trade.
It is important to note that Sartre points out that his grandfather's real
interest in the great authors was "ill concealed." Ill concealed or not, it was
concealed, or at least it was meant to be concealed. If Grandfather
Schweitzer had admitted that his rankings were not really based on
merit, then the claim that the classification by merit was pretextual would
be empty, given that a pretext is an action that is characterized by a
special sort of underlying reason, a reason at odds with those reasons, if
any, that ordinarily provide the grounds for the action. If Grandfather
Schweitzer owned up to classifying authors by their vocabulary, then
there would be no appearance to penetrate; there would be no special
reason at odds with or underlying the action. We would just say:
"Grandfather classifies authors by their vocabulary." The action would.
not be pretextual.

9.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, THE WORDS 65-66 (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1964)

(emphasis added).
10. Earlier in the text, when Grandfather Schweitzer complains that he does not
comprehend a text, his wife explains that his failure is due to the fact that he reads from
the middle, not the beginning, of a text. Id. at 43.

The same would be true of young Sartre, who calls his grandfather's
ranking "pretextual." Because Sartre does in fact read the canonical
works, we have no occasion to question why he would rank the great
authors as he does; there would be nothing to suggest that his
classification is not by merit. When he ranks by merit, there is very
likely no motive for the action at all, given that motives exist only when
the reasons for the action are at odds with the action in some way. With
the ordinary action, there may be no answer at all to the question: "Why
did you do that?" With pretextual action, oppositely, there is an answer.
If there were not, then the term "pretext" would have no specific
application to the speech situation.
So too, if the classification was not by merit, then the whole notion of
pretext would be inapposite. In other words, pretext presupposes here that it
really is a classification by merit. If it is a classification by ease of translation
or breadth of vocabulary, then it is not a pretextual classification by
merit, but not a classification by merit at all. Pretext, properly understood,
operates only in settings where the criteria for the action are met: it is a
classification by merit. The best authors are intentionally rated or placed
at the top.
In the hope of correcting one of the great misconceptions or abuses of
the term "pretext," it bears repeating that to say that the action claimed
(here, classification by merit) is not the action that occurred (here,
classification by vocabulary) is not to describe the action as pretextual,
except in a too loose or extravagant sense. With pretexts, the action is
not feigned. What is concealed is a special reason, a motive, which, like
all motives, cuts against or deviates from the action; what is concealed is
something in the world to be achieved or set up by the action, something
that normally would not strike someone as the upshot of the action.
Soon after the term's first appearance, Sartre uses the term "pretext"
again. This time, Sartre imagines himself riding a train without having
purchased a ticket. In this reverie, he deflects the ticket collector's
demands for a ticket by reversing the situation:
I therefore revealed that I had to be in Dijon for important and secret reasons,
reasons that concerned France and perhaps all mankind. If things were viewed
in this new light, it would be apparent that no one in the entire train had as much
right as I to occupy a seat. Of course, this involved a higher law which
conflicted with the regulations, but if the ticket-collector took it upon himself to
interrupt my journey, he would cause grave complications, the consequences of
which would be his responsibility. I urged him to think it over: was it
reasonable to doom the entire species to disorder under the pretext of
maintaining order in a train ?Il

II.

SARTRE, supra

note 9, at I I (emphasis added).
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Here, one would ask this question: If maintaining order on the train by
insisting that passengers have tickets is a pretext, then what was the
ticket collector really getting at? For pretext to be used in anything but a
loose sense, the answer would have to be that the ticket collector was
demanding a ticket in order to doom the entire species while holding
himself out as maintaining order. But here the evidence is weak. Even if
the ticket collector believed Sartre's claim about the fate of mankind, that
does not necessarily mean that demanding the ticket anyway demonstrates
an intention to doom the species. Even once alerted to what is staked in
demanding the ticket, that stake (dooming the species) could still remain
incidental to the ticket collector's original plan of maintaining order or
enforcing the regulations or doing his job. As long as he demands the
ticket despite the fact that it will doom the species, rather than in order to
doom the species, then maintaining order or enforcing the regulations or
doing his job would not be a pretext at all. Instead, that would be
precisely the point or upshot of demanding the ticket.
A pretext, therefore, is a criticism we make of an action that has a
motive that is, like all motives, at odds in some way with the action: the
motive for the generous action toward the fragile relative is to inherit
under the will. The motive could be greed (because greed is directed at
something-here, at the money that the will would make available). If
the generous action is just plain generous without such directedness,
then it is nonsense to speak in terms of motive, though there may be
reasons for the generosity (for example, feeling good about oneself).2
But such reasons are not motives if they are psychological or inner,'
even though we tend to think of motives as inner states rather than as
explanations of something to be attained in the world by a certain course
of action.13 And while it is common among psychologists to suggest that
all actions have motives (or are motivated), 4 in fact we use the word
"motive" only infrequently in ordinary speech. 5 We use the word only
16
in reference to actions we feel the need to assess, to make sense of.

12. See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L. REV. 17, 72-73
(1991).
13. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]ending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police
officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation ofjudicial resources.").
14. R.S. PETERS, THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATION 31 (R.F. Holland ed., 1958).
15. Id. at 28; N.S. Sutherland, Motives as Explanations, 68 MIND 145, 153 (1959).
16. PETERS, supra note 14, at 29.

Among those actions that do have reasons, not all reasons are necessarily
directed. Considerateness or punctuality, for example, are reasons for
actions, yet they are not motives;
they have no aim, no directedness; they
17
are not setting anything up.
Thus, references to motives come up in moral discourse where we
need to make sense of an action. If we say, "What was his motive?" it
must be because it looks to us as though the action had to be directed at
something unusual or untoward, but we cannot figure out what it was.
When we say that Macbeth's motive in killing Duncan was ambition, we
are not referring to a feeling or some internal perturbation of Macbeth; 18
instead, the motive of ambition refers to some other actions, some other
ends in the world to be attained by the killing, whether or not the actions
are known to him.' 9 Likewise, "if a man looks pleased when praised for
something trivial, or upset when mildly criticized, we can say he is vain,
20
but we cannot say vanity is his motive for being pleased when praised.,
In other words, vanity may explain certain actions, but it cannot be
considered a motive for them. 21 Pretext is therefore an inquiry into a
motive that the actor is covering up. Any actor, once put on the spot by
being questioned about his motives, will either confirm or dispel our
suspicions by going on record and offering a reason for the action or
denying having any reason at all. If we accept that the action had no
motive, or perhaps had no reason whatsoever (as in "I just did it" or "I
just felt like doing it"), 22 then the action cannot be pretextual. Thus
"pretext" is the term we apply to an action that we conclude was directed
in an unconventional or untoward way that the actor was aware of,
regardless of whether he is willing to admit to it when questioned later.
Put slightly differently, if after confronting the explanation for the
action, we cannot accept the action as ordinary or conventional, then we
may be inclined to call it a pretext. For example, we may say: "Your
motive in marrying her was greed; you married her for her money." If
the accused in such a pinch were to respond: "No, I married for love," to
that we may respond: "No, you are incapable of love. The marriage is for
you just a pretext for moneymaking." That is to say, love is the conventional,
ordinary reason for marriage, but it is not the reason for this one.
Accordingly, in its most boiled down form, pretext is a way of criticizing
an action that had a motive that is incompatible with the ordinary,
conventional reasons, if any, for the action.
17.

Id. at 32.

18.
19.

Gudel, supra note 12, at 73.
Id.

20.

Id.

21.

See ROY LAWRENCE, MOTIVE AND INTENTION 23 (1972).

22.

Gudel, supra note 12, at 75.
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III. PRETEXTUAL POLICE ACTION

Likewise, pretextual police action occurs when police do the right thing
for the wrong reasons; 23 they perform a lawful action with an improper
motive. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a search of an
arrestee follows automatically from a lawful arrest. 2 4 This bright line rule
is meant to prevent the destruction of evidence and to protect the arresting
officers from weapons within the arrestee's reach. But what happens if
an officer arrests and searches someone who has violated a law against,
say, public drunkenness, when the officer's motive in arresting-the
whole upshot of the police action-is to look for obscene materials in the
arrestee's satchel?
Defense attorneys plausibly insist that obscene materials or other evidence
of crime found on the arrestee should be suppressed on grounds of pretext,
sham, or bad faith.26 The suppression hearing, their argument runs, should
demand from the arresting officer an account of his reasons for his actions:
"Why did you arrest that person then? You had no interest at all in
enforcing the public drunkenness laws, did you? ' 27 It is the trial judge's
job, under such a view, to decide whether the officer did the right thing
(arrest a drunk) for the wrong reason (to search for obscene materials). If
the officer did arrest the drunk just to explore for obscene materials,
defense attorneys have long argued that the trial judge should invalidate
the otherwise lawful police action on grounds of pretext.28 Invalidating
the arrest would be to hold it unconstitutional, thereby justifying the
exclusion of the evidence, if any, "come at by exploitation of that illegality."2' 9
A.

Whren v. United States

The viability of this defense strategy culminated seven years ago in
Whren v. United States.3 ° In Whren, an unmarked police car containing
two officers and an investigator stopped two African-American youths
23.
24.

See John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 101 (1982).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

25.
26.

Id.
Burkoff, supra note 23, at 72-84.

27. See James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another
Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 641-43 (1985).

28.
29.

See id. at 644-46.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR

MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).

30.

517 U.S. 806 (1996).

in a Nissan Pathfinder for some trivial traffic offenses. 3' In effecting the
stop, police peered into the truck and saw in passenger Michael Whren's
lap some cocaine that was later used to convict him and driver James
Brown of serious drug, not traffic, offenses. 32 Because it was
plainclothes vice-squad officers in an unmarked car enforcing the District
of Columbia's traffic laws-an action that their own departmental
regulations prohibited-Whren and Brown insisted that the traffic stop
was a mere pretext. 33 The traffic stop, the officers indicated, was a
pretext for a drug investigation that could not have warranted the car
stop based merely on the officers' flimsy (but accurate) hunch that drug
activity was afoot.
Though the case made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, it is
unclear just what the parties or the courts take to be the criteria of
pretexts. For example, in its amicus brief, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) asserted: "[H]ad the police conducted themselves in
accordance with the regulation a court •,,34
could presume, subject to
rebuttal, that the search was not pretextua."
Yet in actuality, it is not
the search that was even arguably pretextual; it is the traffic stop. As for
the relevance of the departmental regulations, as dissonant as this may
sound, compliance with them would make a stronger, not weaker, case of
pretext. That is, police compliance with departmental regulations would
make easier our concluding that it really was a traffic stop, which is a
necessary condition of a pretextual traffic stop.
Most of the fifty minute oral argument in Whren involved discussion
of a regulation found in the Metropolitan Police Department's Objectives
and Policies, which held that plainclothes officers in unmarked cars may
make traffic stops only when the traffic violation "is so grave as to pose
an immediate threat to the safety of others. 35 To the petitioners'
attorney Lisa Burget Wright, the police who stopped Whren-Officers
Efrain Soto, Homer Littlejohn, and Investigator Tony Howard 36-should
be held accountable by the Fourth Amendment because reasonable
31.

Id. at 808, 810; see also United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir.

1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
32. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-09. "Whren was sentenced to 168 months incarceration
and five years supervised release on count one, 168 months incarceration and ten years
supervised release on count two, one year imprisonment and one year supervised release
on each of counts three and four. All terms were to be served concurrently." Whren, 53
F.3d at 373. Brown received a nearly identical sentence. Id.
33. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
34. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of
Petitioners at 14 n.6, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
35. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (citing Metropolitan Police Department, Washington,
D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1,Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(a)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992)).
36. Whren, 53 F.3d at 372. The Supreme Court mentions only Officer Soto by
name. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808- 10.
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officers would not have made a stop that their employer precluded them
from making. 37 To this, the Court responded that all the Department38
need do is have the unmarked car ask a marked car to make the stop.

The Court's suggestion, however, would merely make Whren's concern
that his stop was pretextual vanish in a puff of smoke. That is to say, the
problem would vanish but not be solved, as Attorney Wright had posed
this question: How should the Fourth Amendment,
not the police, respond
39
when the police violate their own rules?
There is some uneven precedent on point (which could support just
about any position), which is cited in the Court's opinion.4 ° As for
additional authority on point, it is unclear that either the attorneys or the
Court maximized the potential payoff that could have been provided by
a discussion of what Wayne LaFave has been advocating for nearly forty
years, including in his doctoral dissertation on arrests: 41 administrative
control of discretion. 42 His emphasis on the importance of police having
rules and on courts interpreting breaches of those rules as unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment could help get at whether
police are abusing their discretion, a concern that LaFave has insinuated
into contemporary discussions of policing. 43 But the real payoff of a
discussion of the fact that Soto, Littlejohn, and Howard deviated from
departmental regulations lies in its ability to tell us not whether police
abused their discretion (so what if they did?), but more importantly, to
tell us what they were doing. The real relevance of their breaking their
own regulations, accordingly, is that it is a piece of evidence that bears
on the issue of what they were actually doing. An officer's pulling
someone over when he lacks the authority to do so does not, without
more, make the stop a traffic stop, much less a pretextual traffic stop.
37. See Brief for the Petitioners at 32, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841); Brief
of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of
Petitioners at 6-7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841). But cf Brief for the United States
at 4-7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841) (discussing the "purely objective" approach).
38. Official Transcript at 13, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
39. See id. at 3-29.
40. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-17.
41.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by

Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies
in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442,445-46 (1990).
42.

See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A TREATISE ON THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2(e) (3d ed. 1996).

43. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 377-81 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

This angle is only adumbrated in the Assistant to the Solicitor
General's portion of oral argument, where the interlocutors briefly touch
on snippets from Soto's and Littlejohn's testimonies from the
suppression hearing in Whren. 44 There, Soto testified that the truck was
stopped at a stop sign for over twenty seconds, 45 though earlier, at the
preliminary hearing, he had said he did not know how long the truck
waited at the stop.46 And while Soto testified at the suppression hearing
that the truck failed to signal before turning right, 47 he had made no
mention of that infraction at the preliminary hearing or in the police
report. 48 The only infraction that Soto insisted on throughout the case
was that the truck "sped off quickly," presumably after seeing the
unmarked police car perform a u-turn. 49 But even with regard to the
infraction for speeding, Soto admitted at the suppression hearing that he
"wasn't going to issue a ticket to him at all." 5 Rather, he explained,
"My intention[] was to pull him over and talk to him [about the full time
and speed violations]."'" As fate would have it, however, departmental
regulations prohibited oral warnings except under very narrow
circumstances not present there.52 As for Officer Littlejohn, he never saw
the stop as a response to any traffic violations at all. For him, the delay
at the stop sign gave them reasonable suspicion, though he never came out
53
and said that the reasonable suspicion was specifically of drug activity.
Although the suppression hearing transcript reveals details that were
not alluded to in the oral argument, the fact remains that the attorneys'
colloquy with the bench brought out not only that the officers acted
contrary to departmental regulations, but also that (1) the officers were
neither in agreement nor consistent in their claims that they observed any
traffic violations, and (2) the officers admitted that they did not intend to
enforce the traffic laws at all. And what, exactly, is the relevance of
these details? The officers' deviation from their department's own rules,
along with the way they comported themselves during the pursuit and
stop of the truck (as well as when they went on record about the pursuit
and stop in subsequent legal proceedings), gives us an account of what
44.
45.

Official Transcript at 38-40, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).

46.
48.

Id. at 5 n.5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6 n.6.

49.

Id. at 5.

50.
51.

Id. at 6-7.

47.

Id. at 7 (second alteration in original).
52. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (citing Metropolitan Police
Department, Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1, pt.I, Objectives and Policies
(A)(2)(a)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992)).

53. Official Transcript at 39-40, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841); Brief for the
Petitioners at 6 n.7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
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they were doing. To figure out what police were doing is a crucial matter;
it is much more important than why they were doing it, which is
potentially interesting but doctrinally irrelevant. While the Court asked
the Assistant to the Solicitor General whether "pretextual stops are
fine," 54 I would agree that certainly they are, provided that there is
agreement on the grammar of what they are. The real issue is whether
this was a constitutional,
tha,. is, plain view sighting of drugs pursuant to
55
a lawful traffic stop.

In upholding the convictions, however, the Court never fully engages
the real issue, thus replicating the indirection of the oral argument.
Rather, the Court puts most of its capital into an uninspired attempt at
distinguishing earlier precedents that had referred to how Fourth
Amendment doctrine must be fashioned to deter police from pretextual
searches and seizures of suspects.
Whatever degree of success the
Whren Court might have had in attempting to reconcile its prior pretext
cases, it did succeed in establishing that there is very little room for
pretext arguments in Fourth Amendment law. 57 The conclusion makes
good sense; what remains opaque is why.
To be sure, Whren's argument is hard to take too seriously, given that
it directs reviewing courts to zero in, not so much on what police were
doing (enforcing traffic laws? enforcing drug laws? both?), but why they
were doing it (to make the roads safer? to catch drug dealers? to get
promoted? to kill time?). Recall that Attorney Wright argued that what
justifies a search or seizure is not merely whether police have a certain
amount of suspicion or knowledge about whether crime is afoot"probable cause" in Fourth Amendment terms-but in addition,
"whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop
for the reason given. 58 Indeed, the implications of suggesting that
police articulate why they decided to stop a bad driver are potentially
absurd, leading inexorably to the following: two drivers speeding down
the street, one of whom police believe (but not strongly enough to justify
a stop) is also a drug dealer. 59 The implication of what Attorney Wright
54. Official Transcript at 40-41, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
55. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
56. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-13.
57. Id. at 813.
58.
Whren, 517U.S. at810.
59. Haddad, supra note 27, at 690; James B. Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions,
Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 211
(1977) [hereinafter Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions].

was arguing for Whren and Brown is that, in such circumstances, police
should be allowed to stop only the speeder whom they do not also
suspect of some other crime. In other words, to rule in Whren's favor
would leave us with a doctrine which says, at least to a point, that the
more suspicions you have, the less justification you have to act on
them.60 This, however, is not to say that Whren had no case, just that he
could have made a stronger one.
In dismissing Whren's suggestion that reviewing courts ask questions
along these dead end lines ("Why, officer, did you stop that bad
driver?"), the Court was certainly on the right track in remarking that it
saw "no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that
probable cause justifies a search and seizure.,, 6 And this much is true:
If Whren really had been driving in violation of D.C. law, then police
were right to stop him. Indeed, if police saw him break traffic laws, then
who cares whether police hoped for or even expected a bonus (be it
drugs or whatever) to be realized during the stop? What matters is
whether they were enforcing the traffic laws, not why.
B. Pretextualor Unconstitutional? How to Tell the Difference
Certainly the happy part of the Whren opinion is the Court's insistence
that probable cause that traffic laws had been violated is the key to any
evaluation of the constitutionality of the stop and subsequent search of
the truck. The unhappy part is that the Court made no effort to establish
how we would determine that it was the probable cause on which the
officers were relying when they worked themselves into a position to see
one62 or two 63 baggies of cocaine in Whren's hands. Nowhere does the

Court acknowledge that, even with probable cause to stop the car, police
still might have performed an unconstitutional seizure to verify a hunch
about drug activity rather than perform a lawful traffic stop.
And how would we tell the difference between a lawful traffic stop
and an unlawful drug investigation? That depends on whether what the
officers claim to have done is consistent with what was seen in the
public, observable world. In other words, it is at this point that the
60.

See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 253 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting);

Brief for the United States at 13, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841) ("[I]t would be
unreasonable to forbid a police department from focusing its finite resources

disproportionately on those observed traffic offenders whom officers in the field suspect
may also be engaged in more serious offenses."); Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions,

supra note 59, at 211.
61.
62.
Brief for
63.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 815-18.
Officer Littlejohn testified that he saw one bag of cocaine in Whren's lap.
the Petitioners at 8, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
Officer Soto testified that he saw two bags of cocaine in Whren's lap. Id.
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distinction between intentions and motives, and their roles, should begin
to reveal itself. Suppose, for example, a case in which officers search a
house at night under the authority of a daytime-only search warrant,
discover evidence of crime, and claim later in the litigation that their
intent in entering the house was to make a warrantless emergency arrest. 64
That the officers did not intend to execute a warrantless emergency arrest is
demonstrated by the fact that they applied for a search warrant for
evidence of an illegal distillery, took the warrant to the house, produced
it before entering, and searched the house after locating the suspect.
This is not a pretextual, warrantless entry to arrest; it is not a warrantless
entry to arrest at all because it lacks the characteristics of an action
directed at arresting rather than searching. As a result, any evidence obtained
in the house or on the arrestee's person should be excluded.65 Indeed,
this is an unconstitutional warrantless entry to search, even if there was
probable cause to believe the search victim was a dangerous felon. Unless
police conducted themselves at the house in a way that is consistent with
an intention to rely on the doctrine they now cite as the authority for their
actions, then it is not so much that police were arrestingpretextually (so
what if they were?), but that they were searching unconstitutionally.
If it really was a warrantless entry to arrest, then who cares why it was
performed? What matters is what the police were doing. Did they have
probable cause that a serious crime had been committed? Did they
conclude that getting a warrant posed a danger to themselves or the
public? Did they enter the premises without a warrant and commit
themselves in a way that indicated that they were looking to get their
hands on a dangerous person, not for evidence squirreled away in the
house? 66 If so, then they have performed a lawful, warrantless entry to
arrest a dangerous criminal, and any reason
or motive external to the
67
irrelevant.
is
had
have
might
they
that
action
Once we insinuate the enforcement of traffic laws into the world of the
Fourth Amendment, however, determining what police really were doing
64. Haddad, supra note 27, at 655-57 (citing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493
(1958)). This hypothetical is based very loosely on Jones, which in actuality was a much
closer case, far too close to demonstrate much of anything. There, despite what the
majority found, police really did have reason to believe that Jones, who they knew was
running an illegal still, was inside at the time of the entry. See Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 500-03 (Clark, J., dissenting).
65. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
66. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).

67.

Id.

becomes harder. Take, for example, the case of a male officer that stops
an attractive female motorist who comes to suspect that she has been
stopped for his amusement, not to make the roads safer. Of course it is
always open to the officer to invent a traffic offense, but the motorist in
such a case has worries quite apart from why the traffic stop occurred, that
is, quite apart from whether it was pretextual. Indeed, to claim that the
stop was pretextual is incompatible with a claim that the police later
invented the justification for the stop. Although police perjury is far from
trivial, 68 it is an altogether different sort of problem from that of pretexts.
The only concern here is with suspects whom police do have some
justification in stopping. What the motorist who really is a traffic
offender is expressing when she complains about her encounter with the
overly friendly officer is either (1) despite facts justifying some police
action, it is not that justified action which police were really taking, or
(2) despite facts justifying this police action, the action was motivated by
social objectives. While these two objections to what police have done
tend to be treated as though they are coterminous, they are not. The first
objection is to call the stop unconstitutional; the second objection is to
call it pretextual. Pretexts may be dead or near dead, but the core of
what many defendants claiming pretext are getting at is not, if only
because of a snag in distinguishing pretextual from unconstitutional
police action. That is, what remains open to defendants who could
justifiably have been stopped, but who question the conditions of the
stop anyway, is to argue that police were not doing what they said they
were doing: their actions (regardless of their motives, if motives there
be) did not have the intention that police claim at the suppression
hearing to have had on the street.
Assuming the motorist was speeding or otherwise violating the traffic
laws, there must be some procedures that can be used to reveal what this
officer was putting himself to. If the officer approached the car and
asked the driver out for a date, then it was not a pretextual traffic stop; it
was an unconstitutional one, that is, it was not a traffic stop at all, even
with probable cause. It could have been a traffic stop, but the officer
chose to conduct a social stop instead. If, however, the officer asked her
for her license, registration, and proof of insurance before advising her
of what she had done and issuing her a ticket or warning, then we can
conclude that the officer acted, in the public, observable world, like
someone who intended to enforce the traffic code. In other words, he
was enforcing the traffic code.
68. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Tricke': Investigative
Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police
Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996).
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When I discussed this issue with some San Diego police officers who had
been admonished for mixing the personal with the professional in this
very way, I received a range of responses, which included this one: "So
you mean that if I give her a ticket first and then ask her out it's okay,
but if I ask her out first then it's not?" The answer to this is, of course,
"Yes, from a Fourth Amendment standpoint." In other words, there is little
more we can ask when being asked to take positions on what has occurred
in the public, observable world than that people act in a way that can be
reconciled with their claims about their own actions. (If I am always nice
to you-I treat you uniformly well, attentively, even tenderly-then it
makes little difference whether I really like you.)
Yet to require only that the officer have the intent to rely on the doctrine
in question may not sufficiently protect against pretexts or abuse of the
doctrine. Professor Haddad suggests that when a doctrine is intolerably
susceptible to abuse-to pretextual police action-the doctrine should be
fashioned to defend against that susceptibility. 69 The Court recognized as
much in Chimel v. California70 by putting a stop to thorough searches of
residences incident to the arrest of occupants. 7 1 Before Chimel, officers were
conducting arrests at suspects' residences and converting those arrests
into exploratory searches of the residences without first obtaining search
warrants. 72 The arrests, one could say, were pretextual means of realizing
the motive of ransacking the house. Unhappy with the hazards posed by a
doctrine that permitted such police action-such abuse of the power to
arrest-the Court limited the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest to the arrestee and the area within his immediate reach.73
This approach, which Haddad dubs "the hard-choice approach, 74 has
the appeal of avoiding intractable attempts at uncovering the motive or
motives behind the action, in favor of changing the law in order to take
away the incentive to stage pretextual police actions. Take, for example,
a hypothetical of Haddad' s:

69. Haddad, supra note 27, at 652-53.
70. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
71. Id. at 764-68.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
73. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764-68.
74. Haddad, supra note 27, at 651-53.

Suppose that defense counsel claims that the police have executed a dated but
valid traffic arrest warrant as a pretext to enter a narcotics suspect's house,
hoping to discover heroin either in plain view or within the scope of a search
incident to arrest.
One approach would be to narrow the scope of the underlying power: the
right to enter a home to execute an arrest warrant. The Supreme Court could
declare that arrest warrants expire after a certain period of time, at least where
the police efforts to execute the warrant have lapsed. Or the Court could make a
less drastic alteration in fourth amendment law by declaring that after a period
of time, absent continuous diligent effort to execute a nisdemeanor arrest
warrant, the warrant, though still valid for some purposes, would not authorize
entry into a suspect's home. The Court would reason that if authorities place
such a low priority on a prompt arrest, the governmental interest does not
outweigh the individual's right to be free7 5from police entry into his home at the
nearly unbridled discretion of the police.

In other words, Haddad's hard-choice approach, which itself is
traceable to Justice Brennan's thoughtful dissent in a 1960 case ,7 would
treat the pretext problem as resolvable doctrinally: not by condemning a
given police search or seizure as pretextual, but by changing the
background rules against which police act. Quibbling over whether the
entry was a pretext fails to tell us much, even if the real reason for the
action (why the officer was doing that) rather than what the action was
(the intention of the action) was easily accessible to us. Accordingly,
when a pretext problem arises, if we do not like what police are doing in
such cases, then we should ask, as Haddad would: Did police
demonstrate the intent to rely on the doctrine in question? And if their
having done so does not dispel our concerns about abuse of the doctrine,
then we should consider altering, that is, narrowing, the doctrine.
Whren, however, is an exceedingly difficult case, highly resistant to
evaluating what it was that police were really doing. Assume that the
traffic violations alluded to by Officer Soto did occur. When Officers
Soto and Littlejohn took the stand at the pretrial hearing where Whren
and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine, one could have asked: What,
if anything, was said between the officers before the stop? Did they
discuss the Nissan's erratic movements? Did they discuss their thenunsubstantiated suspicions about drug activity? Did the officers explain
the point of the stop to the driver? If not, then why not? Was it due to
their being distracted? By what? Seeing the drugs? Did the officers
ultimately ticket the driver? Why not? Because it seemed trivial compared
with what was discovered? By questioning the intentions of the officers
in this manner, we get, in their elaboration of what they were doing, a
chance to respond to their commitment-to their going on record-when

75.
76.

Id. at 652 (footnotes omitted).
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248-56 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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they tell us, and expect us to rely on them when they tell us, what their
intentions were. And despite what the U.S. Supreme Court may say, this
inquiry into intentions is a way of determining what happened and is not
meant to be a way of inquiring into what went on behind what happened.
In Whren's case, even if the police did initiate a traffic stop, in light of
their prompt plain view sighting of a bag or bags of cocaine, there was
good reason for their not following through on that original intention or
plan. The traffic stop well might have been the original plan, but it
might have dropped out when, after undertaking that original plan,
police saw that they had their hands on some drug offenders. 77 In this
situation, their failure to follow through-their failure to treat this as a
traffic stop-by no means demonstrates that the stop was, at its
inception, a drug investigation, though it may certainly give us pause.
The difference between this case and the case of the officer who used
the traffic laws to improve his social life has something to do with what
changes in plan, what sorts of distractions, can count in our attempt to
come to grips with what action the officer was performing. In other
words, we could ask: Was Whren a drug investigation (masquerading as
a traffic stop), and was the officer who stopped the attractive motorist
embarking on a social adventure (also masquerading as a traffic stop)?
When the officers converted Whren's traffic stop into a drug
investigation, their overlooking the traffic offenses makes good sense
(though it would certainly lead to their being given a hard time in the
witness box at the suppression hearing). After all, the plain view
discovery of evidence that could lead to decades of imprisonment is just
the sort of distraction to which we may expect law enforcers to yield
when the plan began as a stop that could by itself culminate in no more
than the issuance of a citation and summons.
But then why suggest that the failure to pursue the traffic infractions
in Whren "may certainly give us pause"? Because that is a response that
is open whenever someone says that they were doing something-here,
enforcing the traffic laws-that is at least arguably at odds with the way
they comported themselves. But with the officer who asks the motorist
for a date, we would likely be a good deal more skeptical about the basis
of the distraction. Why be distracted by that? And even if the distraction
is understandable, quite literally natural, that does not adequately explain

77. Cf Haddad, supra note 27, at 678 n.178 (citing cases that hold that a traffic
stop need not culminate in a citation or warning in order to be constitutional).

actually yielding to it, not in the context of policing. Indeed, the basis of
the distraction in such a case is trivial when compared to that in Whren:
trivial, again, in light of the objectives of policing. And even if the
officer who asked the motorist for a date really did observe a traffic
offense and really saw himself as committed, at first, to performing a
traffic stop, all we have to evaluate the action is what we see in the
public, observable world, including of course his account of it. While it
is perfectly plausible that the officer who asked the motorist for a date
was every bit as committed to carrying out the original plan as the
officers in Whren were, I am suggesting only that when his actions
suggest a social call, it is an account that is more likely to be rejected,
given that it is hard to count desire as a distraction in that context. And
the rejection would not be on the ground that it is false, but that it would
have no real sway, not in light of what could
78 pass for a commitment to
enforce the traffic laws in the first instance.
C. The Role of Intentions in FourthAmendment Analysis
By now, this Article has at least begun to establish procedures by
which people may unravel the problem posed by pretextual police
action. These procedures entail questioning police in order that we may
take a position on what they were doing (confronting their intentions) as
opposed to why they were doing it (confronting their reasons, their
motives, their purposes). Whren's weakness is not that it kills off pretext
claims-that is really no weakness at all-but that it threatens to kill off
any meaningful evaluation of what police do. For instance, at one point
the Whren Court remarks that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.

79

For reasons

that remain mysterious, this is a phrase of which the Court is particularly
8
fond. 80 And it is safe to say the parties only compound the problem. '

78.

But cf Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, supra note 59, at 205 (suggesting

that evidence discovered against a traffic offender who was stopped as a pretext for
asking the driver out on a date would be less likely to be challenged by defense counsel

as a pretext than would evidence discovered against a traffic offender who was stopped
as a pretext for a drug investigation).
79. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
80. E.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 123 (2001) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000);
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 604 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Bogan v.
Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996).
81. E.g., Brief for the United States at 15, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841)
("An inquiry into whether an officer's action was 'pretextual' is inherently an inquiry
into his subjective intent.").
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But what could this utterance possibly mean? In this context the word
"subjective" is nonsense, as it must be whenever used to modify "intention"
or any other term of inculpation or exculpation. In other words, there is
no such thing as a subjective intention. Subjective as opposed to what?
Objective? What would the difference denote, exactly? Could one imagine
any specific application of utterances such as, "His subjective intention
was X but his objective intention was r'? If so, then what would it be?
Your intention according to you (subjective) as opposed to your
intention according to others that we may identify through laborious
questioning (objective)? In other words, is it to say that a subjective
intention is a claim you make about your intentions, but an objective
intention is a claim someone else makes about your intentions? If so,
then what makes others' claims objective? Their distance? That is, their
ability to know how things are with us better than we do ourselves? So
there really are two kinds of intentions? That cannot be the law (or the
grammar of "intention" either).
When we refer to intentions, we are trying to make sense out of an action
in a context where subjective and objective have no specific application.
Indeed, speaking in terms of intentions as subjective or objective plays into
one of the great myths of legal notions of responsibility: references to
intentions are references to something inside us. 82 Intentions are said to
be subjective because they are secret "mental states," which can only be
83
inferred by others (objectively) through close observation of behavior.
Take this perfectly conventional and representative account from a
leading book of criminal law theory, where legal philosopher Michael
Moore holds: "My own intentions are usually known to me in a way
82.

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989); United States Postal

Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716-17 (1983).
The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true
that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular time
is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else.
Id. (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885)).
83. See Richard A. Posner, So What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in
OVERCOMING LAW

397 (1995).

Judges and juries do not, as a precondition to finding that a killing was
intentional, peek into the defendant's mind in search of the required intent.
They look at the evidence of what the defendant did and try to infer from it
whether there was advance planning or some other indication of a high
probability of success, whether there was concealment of evidence or other
indicia of likely escape, and whether the circumstances of the crime argue a
likelihood of repetition ....
Id. (emphasis added).

different from how they are known to a third-person observer, the latter
having to make behavioural inferences since he lacks my first-person
experience." 84 Moore says we must infer, a second-rate form of
knowing, but if close enough attention is paid to the data, to the way the
body moves and what the mind must have willed it to do, then we can
discover this thing called the "intention."
This psychologizing of intentions, however, misses out on the function
of discussions of intentions:
Descriptions of mental events or processes are not acceptable as answers to
questions about what our intentions are. A request for our intentions is not a
request for a description of something inside us, but a request for us to perform
a certain act that requires us to go on record or to commit ourselves in a certain
way that
85 justifies the reliance of other persons on what we profess our intentions
to be.

Indeed, Paul Gudel's thoughtful repudiation of the prevailing view
about human action is worth quoting at length:
If intentions are not internal things or happenings, what are they? What sorts of
things can fill in for the variable in the assertion, "My intention is X"? Most
commonly, the place of the X is taken by a verb in the infinitive signifying an
action or achievement. Therefore, the most general definition of an intention is
"an action in prospect."
It is not, then, that intentions are difficult to observe or to have "direct
evidence" of. Intentions simply are not the sorts of things that can be observed,
any more than one can observe the number five (not some particular written or
printed instance of the number five, but the number itself). This does not mean
they are necessarily hidden; it only means that the concept of "observation" has
no obvious application to them. When we say something like, "The intentions
of another cannot be directly observed," we have no coherent idea of what it
would mean to "observe another's intention." If anything is meant by this
phrase at all, it probably is something along the lines of "observe his intention
as he himself observes it." But there is no such thing as this; there is no thing
called "the intention" we observe by introspection just before every action we
take. Intentions are not observed, either by ourselves or by others.
We use the language of intentions, and impute intentions to persons, as a
way of making human actions intelligible to ourselves. We do not make actions
intelligible to ourselves by adverting to an inner event that preceded that action.
Our interest in human actions is not usually in how the' were produced, but in
how they can be morefully understood. Because this is what the attribution of
intentions does, the language of intentions has reference86 to the public,
observable world, not to an inaccessible world of inner events.

Gudel offered this as a response to the U.S. Supreme Court's so-called
"mixed motives" problem in employment discrimination cases, 87 but it
84. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 94 (1993).
85. Gudel, supra note 12, at 84 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id. at 85 (emphasis in third paragraph added).
87. See id. at 18.
[Ilmagine a supervisor who is biased against women and who actively dislikes
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has point in any context where questions of responsibility arise.
References to intentions are made in order to limit responsibility by
demanding that the accused go on record, typically by proffering an
excuse. That is, in asking what your intentions were, we are asking for
an explanation of your actions, but we are not asking for you to make
reports about something inside you, be it a mental state or any other sort
of internal perturbation.
So if we get rid of that misleading referent-subjective-we are left
with the following utterance: "[I]ntentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."8 Now what? Could the
Court really emphasize that probable cause to stop the car was what
made the stop impervious to criticism in Whren, but say at once that
what police intended to do is irrelevant? But what makes probable cause
critical to the constitutionality of searches and seizures is that it is strongly
suggestive that when police act on that knowledge, they do so with a
certain intention. If the police officers' account of their intentionstheir going on record and telling us that we can rely on them when they
tell us what they were doing-is irrelevant, then how would we even
know what it was that they were doing? How would we be able to tell
that it was the traffic violations that occasioned the stop and not some
unsubstantiated hunch, or racism, or spite? Without confronting their
intentions, we would know it was a stop sure enough, but we would not
know if it was a traffic stop, a stop to investigate drug activity, a stop to
kill time, or whatever. In other words, we cannot know what to make of
the action once it is called into question unless we take a stab at getting
the accused to go on record about how things were with him. Of course
the intentions of police matter; investigating intentions and finding out
what was done are on the same level, part of the same enterprise. When
we get to the suppression hearing in criminal cases, questioning police
dealing with women in the workplace. Imagine also that one of his employees
is a woman who has her failings as an employee-perhaps she is chronically
absent from work or achieves consistently low performance levels. At some
point, the supervisor fires her.
Now imagine that the woman sues the employer for sex discrimination and
at trial introduces evidence that her supervisor was biased against women. The
employer introduces evidence that the woman was fired because she was a
poor employee. This is what the courts have called a "mixed motives" case.
How do we sort out the relationship between the facts submitted by both sides
and the employer's decision?

Id.
88.

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).

about their intentions is essential to our evaluation of what they have
done. Otherwise we would not know how to respond to what happened.
But to say, as the Court did in Whren (and has reiterated since), that the
intentions of police are irrelevant" is to say that our interest in what
police have done is irrelevant. And that much is wrong.
But in this particular, and peculiar, utterance it is evident what the
Court is getting at, or more accurately, what it is revealing: a view of
intentions which casts them as internal states, the meaning of which is
inferred through close observation. Yet if intentions are part of the secret,
subjective selves, then how can we ever avoid being held hostage by
lies and indirection ("No one can tell me what I was thinking!") except
by, in the Whren Court's words, "root[ing] out.., subjective intent
through ostensibly objective means' 90 (whatever that means). By making
this recommendation, what the Court is responding to is the difficulty in
knowing others, that difficulty accounting for the development of a
doctrine that makes the hidden, secret selves-the "state of mind" 9 ' of
others-irrelevant whenever possible. This, however, badly mischaracterizes
what an intention is, which is simply a device, a way of talking about
human action, for making action intelligible where there is some reason
to question what was done.
All this seems to only glance off the Court. When the Court elaborates in
Whren that "the Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness'
allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the
subjective intent,' '92 it is hard to get a picture of what, in the Court's
view, would constitute an action without an intention, subjective or
otherwise. By definition, an action has an intention.9 If you are pushed
or stung by a bee or are having a seizure, then you are not acting at all; if
you harm someone by mistake or accident, then you have acted, though
there your intentions in one way or another misfire: you stray or
something befalls. In other words, an action without an intention is a
happening or an occurrence, but not an action.94 You perform an action
intentionally only if you have some idea of what you are doing, when
89.

See cases cited supra note 80.

90.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 814.

Id.
Id.; see also Kenneth Gavsie, Note, Making the Best of' "Whren": The
Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385,
387 n.22 (1998) ("[Plrobable cause for any traffic violation will suffice for a reasonable
stop regardless of an officer's true intentions.").
93. See J.L. Austin, Three Ways of Spilling Ink, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 280-81
(J.0. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed. 1979) ("1 may 'have no purpose (whatsoever)'
91.
92.

in doing something, just as I may take no care.

(whatsoever)' in doing something.").
94.

But I don't 'have no intention

See CARLOS J. MoYA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 12 (1990).
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you are putting yourself to whatever is realized.95 J.L. Austin captures
what he calls this "most subtle ... notion[]" of intention when he writes:
I must be supposed to have as it were a plan, an operation-order or something of
the kind on which I'm acting, which I am seeking to put into effect, carry out in
action: only of course nothing necessarily or, usually, even faintly, so fullblooded as a plan proper. When we draw
96 attention to this aspect of action, we
use the words connected with intention.

As Austin's most celebrated student put it, "[Y]ou can't be intending to
do a thing if you don't know you're doing it, or rather don't know how
what you are doing could have that consequence (if you didn't know
about the child, you can't have intended to frighten it)., 97 That is, when
committing yourself to a course of action that could be called
intentional, you must see far enough ahead to appreciate the implications
of your actions. Austin likens this aspect of intentions to "a miner's
lamp on our forehead which illuminates always just so far ahead as we
go along. '98 Austin is careful to note that the lamp does not illuminate
very well or far because the circumstances under which actions take
place dictate that even when people take care, much remains outside of
or incidental to their intentions.99
Thus, a police officer who does not mean to do anything at all is not
acting, period. Accordingly, "in assessing official responsibility for police
acting as police, it makes good sense to require that police intend to
investigate crime or enforce laws before they may be held responsible in
their investigative or enforcement capacities."' 00 Likewise, when we are
confronting the question of whether a search or seizure is constitutional, we
cannot get an accurate picture of what was done without confronting what it
was that police were putting themselves to. A traffic stop is characterized
not merely by the fact that police pull someone over intentionally; that
would demonstrate only that it was a stop. But by claiming to foreclose
on inquiries into police intentions, the Supreme Court threatens to
foreclose on our telling the difference between a plan (though nothing so
concrete as a plan) to effect a traffic stop, a drug investigation, or an
95.
96.

Austin, supra note 93, at 283.
Id. (footnote omitted).

97.

Stanley Cavell, A Matter of Meaning It, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY?

233 (1969).
98. Austin, supra note 93, at 284.
99. Id.
100.

Daniel Yeager, "Oops! ": Inadvertence, Intentionality, and the Police, 24

SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 157 (1997).

instance of harassment, racial or otherwise. Evaluating the constitutionality
of the stop entails coming to grips with the officers' account of their
intentions in the context of the other facts available. And to the extent that
the Court says otherwise-and they do-is more than a little misleading.
IV. ARKANSAS V. SULLIVAN: CONFRONTING THE REMNANTS OF WHREN

In State v. Sullivan, Officer Joe Taylor, then an eleven-year veteran of
policing in various Arkansas police departments, °( followed Kenneth
Sullivan to a gas station in Conway, Arkansas to admonish Sullivan for
driving forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone. 02 When
asked to produce registration and insurance documents, Sullivan opened
his door, allowing Taylor to see that Sullivan, a disabled, unemployed
roofer, had a rusted roofing hatchet corroding into the carpet of the
car. 10 3 After stopping Sullivan, Taylor "recognized him as someone that
he had seen intelligence on regarding narcotics, and ... rather than write

citations, he physically arrested him" 4 for speeding, failure to produce
registration or proof of insurance, carrying a weapon (the hatchet), and
having improperly tinted windows and a broken speedometer.' 5 Taylor
performed an inventory search of the car, which revealed, inter alia,
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia stashed in a black bag under
the armrest.1°6 Sullivan was eventually charged with everything but the
failure to produce registration and insurance.)'
The trial court granted Sullivan's motion to suppress the drugs. 0 8
In a brief opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed' 0 9 and then
published its 4-3 denial of the State's request for rehearing.' 10 According to
the state's high court, the arrest "was pretextual in nature, in that it was
made solely for the purpose of searching [Sullivan's] vehicle for
controlled substances."'''

101. Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 38, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed Nov.
18, 1998) (No. 98-732).
102. State v. Sullivan, I I S.W.3d 526, 526 (Ark. 2000), opinion supplenmnted on denial
qfreh'g, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark. 2000), and rev'd, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
103. Id.
104. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on
denial of rehearing).
105. Sullivan, I I S.W.3d at 526.
106. Id. at 527.
107. Id.

108.

Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 80-87, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed

Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732).
109. Sullivan, I I S.W.3d at 528 (mentioning Whren nowhere).
110. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on denial
of rehearing) (discussing Whren).
I 11. Sullivan, II S.W.3d at 527.
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This is a correct, that is, technical use of the term "pretext," provided
that the Arkansas Supreme Court means that in approaching Sullivan,
Taylor was relying on his radar gun, though his motive in enforcing
speeding laws was to further a drug investigation that otherwise would
not have permitted a search or seizure of Sullivan. But as is so often the
case, it is not clear just what is meant here by "pretext," especially once
the court elaborates its position. The court continues, first by stating
"that 'pretext' is a matter of the arresting officer's intent,"1 12 and second,
that pretext is a matter of evaluating "whether an ulterior motive
prompted an arrest."" 3 This ulterior motive would make the police action
unlawful as long as the "covert motive" is "dominant" over another, that
is, "dual," but somehow not covert (not ulterior), motive.' 14
Pretext is indeed informed by the officer's intent and motive, if any,
but the Arkansas Supreme Court, like the U.S. Supreme Court in Whren,
makes no effort at all to clarify for us what the officer must, or must not,
intend in order for the action in question to be a pretext. Again, the
officer's intention is relevant to a claim of pretext: if the officer is not
doing what the Constitution permits-if it is not a justified search or
seizure-then it is not a pretextual action, but an unconstitutional one.
That is, if the officer lacks the antecedent suspicion that the Constitution
requires for the search or seizure in question, then putting himself to the
task in such circumstances-intending to search or seize, but lacking
the authority on these facts-makes the action plainly and simply
unconstitutional, not pretextual.
There is no way to know what the Arkansas Supreme Court had in
mind in Sullivan because, rather than explicating what it meant for
pretexts to be "a matter of the arresting officer's intent,", 5 it went on to
state that the lawfulness of the actions in question depends on which of
two motives dominates: the ulterior (covert?) or some other motive that
is dual but not ulterior (or covert). This, the so-called "mixed motive"
problem, 116
is a description of human action that has pervaded Title VII
litigation for years and has turned out to be an unhappy-at-best way of
talking about motives, indeed, about responsibility." 7 1assume here that

112.

Id.

113. Id.
114. Id.at 528.
115. Id.at 527.
116. See discussion supra note 87.
117.

See Gudel, supra note 12 (providing excellent treatment of the problem).

the ulterior, or covert, motive is to conduct a drug investigation, which,
for the court, undermines or corrupts the intention to enforce the traffic
laws. This is indeed a pretext, provided, of course, that the officer is
aware of the motive-that he sees himself relying on the traffic offense
in order to pursue a drug investigation. A person can have conscious or
unconscious motives.' 18 There is no such thing, however, as an unconscious
motive that can count as a pretext, given that "pretext" has the overtone of
connivance or manipulation, neither of which can be done inadvertently.
But what is the other motive the court has in mind, the one that makes
the motives dual? Here I assume it to be the "motive" to enforce the
traffic laws. But that could not be the motive for enforcing the traffic
laws any more than racial discrimination could be the motive for an act
of racial discrimination. If an officer is enforcing the traffic laws for the
usual reasons (sense of duty, boredom, angling for a promotion), or for
no reason at all (he just felt like it), then there is no motive for his
actions, ulterior or otherwise. This is not to say that two motives could
not operate in the same case. They could: the officer stops a speeding
motorist on good probable caus& both to ask the motorist out for a date
and to facilitate a drug investigation. Please note that both objectives
here fit the criteria of motives. They have that directedness (not
inwardness) that a motive must have and are outside of, or incompatible
with, the conventional aim (if any) of the action. Traffic stops are not
social calls and drug investigations are justified by suspicion of drug
activity, not of bad driving.
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court's compressed opinion tells us
little about pretexts and their relation to intentions and motives, the
court's opinion bears a striking resemblance to the approach that
Attorney Wright took for her clients, Whren and Brown. Wrapping up
its decision to affirm the trial court's order suppressing the evidence
found in Sullivan's car, the court explained:
The question then becomes whether appellee would have been arrested simply
for traveling forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone and
possessing a roofing hatchet that had clearly been in his vehicle for quite a long
time, given that it was corroding into the carpet. We find that to be doubtful.
His vehicle may have been impounded due to his failure to provide proof of
insurance and registration. However, appellee was never charged with having
no proof of insurance or vehicle registration.' 9

118. LAWRENCE, supra note 21, at 10 ("[llmagine that a particularly memorable
abomination of Caligula's afforded his assassin a motive to kill him, yet that the man
struck in ignorance ofthat reason but for a different one (say, because Caligula had made
his horse a priest). Or, what is less likely, for no reason.").
119. Sullivan, I I S.W.3d at 528. Although the Arkansas Supreme Court emphasized
that Sullivan was an unemployed roofer, that the hatchet was for roofing, and that the
hatchet was rusted into the carpet, the suppression hearing transcript reveals, as well, that
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Would Officer Taylor have arrested Sullivan based merely on the
traffic offenses and the roofing hatchet? This is what Attorney Wright
had pressed the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt as the standard in
Whren.120 When asked by Sullivan's attorney, Taylor insisted not only
that he would have, but also that, as a Class A misdemeanor, possession
of a weapon required arrest in order to assure that the offender be
fingerprinted. I' 1 He even indicated, rather reluctantly, that his decisions
to arrest rather than cite depend generally in part on how productive a
shift he has had.122 But the vices of such a line of questioning deeply
outweigh its virtues. Now that Taylor has been asked what role the
hatchet played in the arrest, now what? Would it help if defense counsel
could point to similar cases in which that officer did not arrest the
suspect? 23 All that would prove is that discretion operates in policing,
but that is by no means a condemnation of it. Again,24 what matters is
whether the traffic laws were being enforced, not why. 1
the hatchet was over a foot long and was found on the narrow strip of carpet between the
driver's seat and door-hardly the place one would store tools. Hearing on Motion to
Suppress at 41-42, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732).
120. See Brief for the Petitioners at 31, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996) (No. 95-5841).
The question that has divided the lower courts is what standard of objective
justification applies when the defendant alleges that the asserted basis for a
search or seizure was a pretext to evade applicable Fourth Amendment
constraints. Although this Court has never had to decide that question, its
precedents and the purposes of the Fourth Amendment support the rule that
such intrusions are unreasonable if they deviate so far from standard police
practices that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have
made the intrusion on the basis asserted. This standard prohibits arbitrary
intrusions without "immunizing" defendants suspected of greater crimes from
stops that would otherwise have been made.
Id.
121. Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 59, 62, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed
Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732).
122. Id. at 57-58.
123. In fact, Sullivan's counsel did just that. /d. at 61-65.
124. This is not to say that there are no impermissible reasons for police action. A
discriminatory stop would violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Nonetheless, such stops based on race, national origin, gender, alienage, or "legitimacy,"
while unconstitutional, do not have what one could call a "discriminatory motive."
Rather, they are plainly and simply, discriminatory actions. See, e.g., Gudel, supra note
12, at 79.
[Il]t is not clear what a "discriminatory motive" is....
If discriminatory acts do have motives, they would have to be motives other
than those such as "racial bias." Moreover, discriminatory acts may be
performed without a "discriminatory motive." An employer's motive for
refusing to hire more blacks could be that his customers might refuse to deal

Indeed, the second half of the passage quoted above hints at this
essential condition of evaluating police responsibility. If the search of
the car had been to inventory its contents for administrative purposes,
then we would need to know what, under Arkansas law, justifies an
inventory search. Arkansas law holds, "A vehicle impounded in
consequence of an arrest, or retained in official custody for other good
cause, may be searched at such times and to such extent as is reasonably
necessary for safekeeping of the vehicle and its contents." 25 In addition,
police "shall inventory the passenger compartment of said vehicle and
any other area of said vehicle for the purpose of protecting any valuables
which may be found in said vehicle," but that "any locked
containers
26
found within the vehicle shall be ...noted" as locked.
One can see what the Arkansas Supreme Court was worried about
here: if the inventory search was justified by an arrest for failure to
produce registration and insurance, then it seems a little fishy that
prosecutors never charged Sullivan with the very offense that is said to
have justified the search. Still, the fact that prosecutors never followed
up on the case that police began tells us almost nothing,12 even if the
failure to produce registration and insurance was the only lawful basis
for the inventory search, which it was not. According to Arkansas law,
with him if he had a largely black work force. This is not a discriminatory
motive, except in the tautological and therefore completely uniformative and
irrelevant sense of "whatever motive a discriminatory act had." But it does not
matter that this employer's motive is not discriminatory, because the act is a
discriminatory one, and therefore illegal, regardless of its motive.
Id.

125. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 12.6(b).
126. See Memorandum from Timothy P. Daley, Chief of Police, Conway Police
Department, to Conway Police Department Personnel (July 25, 1994) (presented as
State's Exhibit No. I, Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 88, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir.
Ct. filed Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732)). This likely complies with the U.S. Supreme
Court's injunction in Florida v.Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), which demanded that police
departmental inventory procedures take a position on whether or which closed containers
discovered in the car may be searched. Id. at 4. Recall that in Sullivan, the drugs were
found in a closed container, a black bag, under the armrest. State v. Sullivan, II S.W.3d
526, 527 (Ark. 2000), opinion supplemented on denial of reh'g, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark.

2000), and rev'd, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
127. Cf J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDs 44 (J.O. Urmson & Marisa
Sbisii eds., 2d ed. 1975).
1 must, of course, have the intention, if I am not to be insincere, at the time of
my utterance: but what exactly is the degree or mode of the infelicity if I do
not afterwards do it? Or again, in 'I bid you welcome', to say which is to
welcome, intentions of a kind are presumably vaguely necessary: but what if
one then behaves churlishly? Or again, I give you advice and you accept it,
but then I round on you: how far is it obligatory on me not to do so? Or am I
just 'not expected' to do so?: or is part of asking-and-taking advice definitely
to make such subsequent conduct out of order? Or similarly, I entreat you to
do something, you accede, and then I protest-am I out of order? Probably yes.
Id.
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which for now 28 reflects the U.S. Supreme Court's view as well, 29 any
offense is arrestable. But the court's point here, though it is certainly not
made explicit, is that not all arrests necessarily make the car in which the
arrestee is found subject to impoundment. As sensible as that limitation
may be, nothing in Arkansas law
suggests that only some arrests can
0
trigger the inventory procedure.13
This rather broad power to arrest allowed Officer Taylor to arrest
Sullivan for offenses that Taylor (or his employer) had no interest in
pursuing. The majority suspected that, instead, the pretextual arrest was
made with the motive of exploiting a rather broad power to conduct a
thorough inventory search of the car. Indeed, though the Arkansas Supreme
Court took no note, Whren itself distinguished three of the U.S. Supreme
Court's own precedents, which insist that administrative searches,
including inventory searches, "must not be a ruse ' 3for a general
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."' '
In response to the State's request for a rehearing, the Arkansas Supreme
Court elaborated that the stop was justified by the radar gun, but that in
arresting Sullivan and coming up with the weapons charge, Officer
Taylor had not comported himself "appropriate[ly].' 32 The court did
not elaborate. Positing that Whren does not go

128. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a)(iii). On remand to the Arkansas Supreme Court,
the parties briefed whether Arkansas law places any limitations on police officers' power
to arrest for trivial offenses and pretextual police action that the U.S. Constitution does
not. See Appellees' Motion to Rebrief Issues on Remand from U.S. Supreme Court,
Sullivan, II S.W.3d 526 (No. 99-1140).
129. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
130. See, e.g., Mounts v. State, 888 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994); Folly v.
State, 771 S.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that inventory searches can
occur (1) before the impoundment, (2) without regard for whether alternatives to impoundment
are feasible, or (3) whether the car is lawfully parked).
131. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Wells,
495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)
(approving inventory search because there was "no showing that the police, who were
following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
investigation")); id. (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717 n.27 (1987)
(upholding administrative inspection of junkyard because search did not appear to be "a
'pretext' for obtaining evidence of ... violation of ... penal laws")).
132. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on
denial of rehearing); Hearing on Motion to Suppress at 81, State v. Sullivan (Ark. Cir.
Ct. filed Nov. 18, 1998) (No. 98-732).

so far as to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle
with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed
the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding,
and conduct
133
a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity,

the court denied the State's request. It is one thing, the court concluded,
for someone like Whren to be arrested when police see him with cocaine
in his lap; it is another thing altogether to "effect[] a pretextual arrest for
purposes of a search, such as we have in the instant case."'' 34 Anything
in Whren that could be read otherwise is, in the Arkansas Supreme
Court's opinion, dicta.
In his dissent, Justice Glaze pointed out that Sullivan had committed a
series of violations, which Taylor explained to him were the basis of his
36
arrest. 35 Without worrying whether the hatchet really was a weapon,1
Justice Glaze added that Arkansas law permits arrests even for minor
traffic infractions and permits inventory searches incident thereto. 137 He
agreed with the majority that Whren prohibits police from stalking
motorists until they commit an infraction. 38 Evidently, it mattered to
Justice Glaze that Sullivan was not suspected as a drug dealer until
Taylor recognized him after the stop. Why this mattered he did not say.
Nonetheless, Justice Glaze relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case that
ruled that "a traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid by the
fact that it was 'a mere pretext for a narcotics search."", 139 To hold
otherwise, he concluded, "will generate considerable confusion among
' 40
the rank and file of law enforcement, the bench, and the bar alike.'
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari
and reversed.' 4' In a short, per curiam opinion, the Court insisted that
142
the Arkansas Supreme Court had ruled "flatly contrary" to Whren.
Specifically intending to re-establish Whren as the controlling precedent
in cases like these, the Court reiterated its "unwilling[ness] to entertain
Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of
individual officers," and that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." 143 Nothing more
133.
134.

Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
Id. at 553.

135.

Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 554.
Id.
Id. at554-55.
Id. at 555 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)).

140.

Id.

141.

Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001).

142.
143.

Id. at 771.
Id. at 771-72 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))

(alterations in original).

[VOL. 40: 611, 2003]

The Stubbornness of Pretexts
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

was said.' 44 Justice Ginsburg concurred separately, joined by Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer. She emphasized that while the Court did
not answer the state high court's concerns about whether police could
stalk a motorist hoping for a traffic infraction, arrest the motorist, and
search incident to that arrest, Whren's ban on pretextual claims certainly
makes that very strategy perfectly constitutional. 4 5 That the four
concurring Justices, who have come to accept that implication of Whren
as the law of the land, find it nonetheless regrettable is manifest.
What happened here? Why, given that at least seven times since
Whren was decided the Court in criminal cases has declaimed the
46
irrelevancy of intentions, motivations, and other subjective matters,1
would the Court have to decide yet another case to establish this already
well-established, oft-uttered, proposition? What should the Arkansas courts
have seen that they did not? And perhaps more importantly, if Sullivan
was decided in order to straighten out a misconception about the meaning of
Whren, then what exactly has been straightened out by Sullivan?
By now it should be evident that what went wrong in the Arkansas
Supreme Court owes to Whren. Not even certain what to count as
relevant, the state high court was convinced that what Officer Taylor had
done was fishy, but it could not seem to find a way to voice what,
exactly, he had done wrong. If Taylor's actions were in fact not
appropriate, 14 7 then what made them so? What would have legitimated
them? A different motive? What sort of motive would that be? As for
the dissenters, crucial to their position was that Sullivan's drug activity
was a surprise to police, at least until he was pulled over. But that fact,
without more, neither makes nor breaks the State's case.
Ultimately, what went wrong in the Arkansas Supreme Court was not so
much the result, but the way it was reached-by a complete failure to see
the difference between intentions and motives, that is, between action and a
very particular sort of reason for action. That failure is what doomed the

144.

The Court seemed so intent in slapping down the lower court that it appears

not to have noticed that the case presented the intriguing issue of whether the Bertine

exception to the pretext-is-irrelevant rule would permit challenge of a vehicle inventory
made possible only by a post-arrest impoundment itself linked to a pretextual arrest.
Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment as a "Big Time" TV Fad, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
265, 270 n.17 (2001); see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
145. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 772-73 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
146. See cases cited supra note 80.
147. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000) (supplemental opinion on
denial of rehearing).

state court's attempt to distinguish some constitutional from unconstitutional
police practices. And given Whren's having established that (1) subjective
intentions play no role in Fourth Amendment analysis, (2) subjective
intentions and actual motivations evidently are the same phenomenon, and
(3) nothing matters but probable cause, it is certainly safe to say that both
the majority and the dissenters in the Arkansas Supreme Court were doing
their best to follow an impenetrable law of the land.
But what has Sullivan done to correct what was flatly contrary to the
law of the land? Reiterated the law of the land? But that threatens only
to perpetuate the problem, that "considerable confusion" of which
Justice Glaze wrote. 4 8 Indeed, the courts that have employed Sullivan
thus far have continued to interpret it in different ways, 49 most of them
perfectly plausible in light of the way the compressed opinion was drafted.
Simply put, nothing has been straightened out. Sullivan seems more to
have pointed to Whren than to have explicated it. By reiterating its
"unwilling[ness] to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the
actual motivations of individual officers" and that "[s]ubjective intentions
50
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,"'
the Court not only fulfilled its goal of deleting pretexts from Fourth
Amendment discourse, but also incidentally banned any reference to
intentions. This, in turn, would have the effect of foiling any attempt to
understand what happened in any given case. Based on the cases that
already allude to Sullivan, the problem is not going to go away, not until
it is made clearer just what pretexts are. Since neither Whren nor
Sullivan established the criteria of pretexts, pretexts will continue to
plague constitutional criminal procedure.
V. CONCLUSION

It is not so much the stubbornness of defense counsel or of courts that
accounts for the tendency of pretext arguments to somehow continue to
rehabilitate themselves. The U.S. Supreme Court keeps enjoining such
arguments from Fourth Amendment discourse, but it is difficult to abide
by an injunction whose terms you do not comprehend. The situation is
148. See supra text accompanying note 139.
149. United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 1950 (2002); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565-67 & n.1 I (D.C.

Cir. 2002); Jefferson v. United States, 776 A.2d 576, 580 (D.C. 2001); United States v.
Page, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 56
M.J. 541, 545-46 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2001); People v. Patterson, Ill Cal. Rptr. 2d
896, 900 (Ct. App. 2001); Powell v. State, 776 A.2d 700, 714 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2001); People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 641-42 & n.l (N.Y. 2001); State v. Lamont,
631 N.W.2d 603, 610 (S.D. 2001).
150. United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (alterations in original).
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far from hopeless, however. To see that pretext arguments posit that
police acted with a particular motive, a motive known to them, would
make possible our seeing as well that to call something a pretext is to
acknowledge that the action was indeed constitutional. But getting to
the point that we accept that the action in question really was
constitutional requires a confrontation with the officer's account of his
intentions, a confrontation that the U.S. Supreme Court, in both Whren
and Sullivan, threatens to preclude.
The Justices' concerns about subjectivity would be well founded if
such inquiries really did require mind reading-encounters with inner,
hidden, secret selves. If that is what confrontations with intentions entail, as
so often it is suggested they do, 15 1 then they should be enjoined. But
confrontations with intentions are not attempts to penetrate privacy; they
are attempts to evoke responses about how things were with the person
whose intentions we question. And by asking that they explain how
things were with them-what they were doing, what the plan was, what
remained incidental, what went wrong-we are asking them to elaborate
the public, observable world when we feel the need to make sense of an
action that strikes us as unusual or untoward. Without leaving room in
constitutional criminal procedure for so central, so homely an activity as
the proffering of an excuse, we impede the entire project of regulating
police, whose actions can be neither meaningfully praised nor meaningfully
blamed if they cannot be understood.
By arguing here for the relevance, even centrality, of intentions in any
regime directed at regulating the police, I am not suggesting that motives
themselves are hidden or inner and should, for that reason, be banished
from criminal-procedure discourse. They are not. Motives themselves
are directed in a way that they can be assessed, given that they tend to
culminate in the realization or setting up of a plan. It is not, therefore,
that motives are interior any more than intentions are. The problem with
motives, that is, what accounts for their irrelevancy to evaluations of
human action, is that motives are by definition external to the action:
their "directedness" points the actor at other actions, other plans, other
151. See, e.g., Diana Roberto Donahoe, "Could Have," "Would Have:" What the
Supreme Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United States, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1193, 1200-01 (1997) ("Although pretext, by definition, entails an assessment of motive,
the Supreme Court has clearly held that an inquiry into the officer's subjective state of
mind is inappropriate. This rule makes sense when one considers the difficulty of
reading the officer's mind as he makes quick decisions on the street." (footnotes
omitted)).

upshots. And given that in moral discourse, be it in the context of law or in
garden-variety settings, we are generally more concerned with what
people are doing than why they are doing it (what they hope to get out of
it), the U.S. Supreme Court is correct to deeply discount the importance
of motives in evaluations of police practices. What is left now is only to
see the extent to which the criteria of motives diverge from those of
intentions; to acknowledge as much is essential in assessing whether a
search or seizure is pretextual as opposed to unconstitutional, a serious
matter for the Fourth Amendment.

